This article is concerned in part to inform the quest for an understanding of the perceptions which Muslim minorities have of Western welfare state provision, but its wider purpose is to explore the essence and the potential of the Islamic welfare state. Heuristic models constructed by social policy academics have provided insights into the influences of religion upon different kinds of welfare state, but no model exists by which specifically to understand Islamic welfare traditions. The article explains the Islamic tradition of Zakat; its significance as one of the central pillars of Muslim faith, and the principles through which it addresses the relief of poverty and the redistribution of wealth. Islamic conceptions of state and community are then explored and the ways in which Muslim faith and culture are adapting at both the global and community level. The article concludes with some speculative remarks about the scope for rapprochement between Western debates about the moral basis for welfare and Muslim perspectives on social justice.
Christian world does not. In the event, we have found these three tasks to be indivisible and what can be said within the limits of this article is necessarily modest in scope and tentative in nature.
We have given precedence, however, to the third of these objectives, since it is from an understanding of Islamic principles that any discussion of Muslim perspectives must flow. This is a necessary preparatory point, since it is essential to distinguish between the tenets of Islam and the cultural practices of various Muslim communities and countries around the world. There is a gathering tendency within political and popular discourse to construe Islamic 'fundamentalism' as a threat to the world order and therefore to demonise all things Muslim (Esposito, 1992) . For this reason, it is as important to disentangle underlying principles from their often distorted manifestations as it is to separate fact from prejudice.
Islam is an idea. It has been described as 'perhaps the only idea of its kind in today's world' (Beedham, 1994, p. 3) . What makes Islam distinctive is not only its claim to transcendental certainty, but also its unitary character. It eschews the dualism of the Western Enlightenment and thereby the inherently ambiguous distinctions between body and soul; between the secular and the religious; between state and church; between politics and morality; between public obligation and private belief. Islam is at one and the same time a religion and an ideology. There is an irony here. In an era when it is suggested that all the 'grand narratives' of Western modernity have been exhausted (Lyotard, 1984) , theorists of the left would seem to be struggling in one of two directions. Some would seek to recapture the idea that human welfare can result from reasoned human action: 'that there is no cure for the wounds of the Enlightenment other than the radicalized Enlightenment itself ' (Habermas, 1986 , cited in Callinicos, 1989 . Writers like Doyal and Gough (1991) , for example, have reasserted a theory of human need that is universal rather than relative. The other direction is that of eco-socialism or civil society socialism, whose proponents may be described as 'radical democrats' (ibid), in so far as they advocate a form of democratised civil society in which human co-operation would be governed neither by the compulsion of market forces, nor by the power of the dirigiste state (e.g., Keane, 1988) . On the one hand, therefore, there is a quest for a certainty which the unravelling of Enlightenment traditions has eroded; on the other, there is a quest for a more unitary form of social organisation. Islam as ideology has concepts and ideas which speak to both these quests.
R E L I G I O N A N D W E L FA R E
Western social policy academics have paid some attention to the role of religion and religious concepts in the formation of different types of welfare state. However, this has not extended to a consideration of Islam and of the Muslim nations to be found, inter alia, in the Gulf, the Middle East, the South Asian sub-continent and parts of North Africa. In fairness, as we shall see, it is arguable whether Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran or Pakistan can be described as 'true' Islamic states, but equally, in what sense can it be said that Britain is a Christian state?
The seminal taxonomy of welfare regimes provided by EspingAndersen (1990) identified three kinds of welfare state within the capitalist world: the liberal, the conservative and the social democratic. One element of this explanatory scheme, if lifted from its structural context, would associate these three kinds of regime with Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, continental European Catholicism and Nordic secularism respectively. It is in fact possible to map elements of EspingAndersen's empirically derived typology onto the historical analysis advanced by Mann (1987) and, in the light not least of more recent developments, to suggest that the broadly dominant models now in evidence in the Western world are the constitutionalist-liberal American model and the conservative-corporatist European model (for a developed version of this argument see Dean, 1996, ch. 3) . The former is associated with predominantly Protestant countries and with a morality founded in utilitarian individualism. The latter is associated with predominantly Catholic countries and with a morality based on solidarity (using that term in the distinctive sense derived from Catholic teaching and Christian Democracy -see Spicker, 1991) .
Attempts have also been made to characterise the nature of Confuscian welfare states (Jones, 1993) . In addition to highly developed Japan, there are a number of economically dynamic countriesHong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea -in Asia Pacific which, though they spend proportionately less on welfare than Western-style welfare states, all have incipient welfare programmes. Jones argues that all these countries are broadly subject to 'sets of common precepts, values, prohibitions' deriving from popular Confucianism, a belief system which posits the existence of the impermanent individual in relation to the enduring social whole that is constituted by the hierarchical family and community (ibid. p. 202). The Confucian model is described as 'corporationist' (not corporatist), in the sense that the state functions as might a corporation or enlarged family through the generation of top-down consensus. The underlying morality might be defined as 'utilitarianistic familism' (S. K. Lau cited in Jones 1993, p. 215) .
To characterise Muslim states in similar terms is not easy and is not something which the authors are at present able to do on an kind of empirical basis. However, there is also a conceptual difficulty in so far as, under Islam, the political character and the moral basis for state intervention ought in one sense to be inseparable. In practice Muslim states, like Confucian states, would seem to be highly pragmatic with regard to the elements of Western example which they might adapt or discard. None the less, if it were possible to identify the characteristic basis of the political framework in which welfare should ideally be organised under Islam, it might best be described as 'popular vicegerency' (Maududi 1986, p. 183) . That is to say, responsibility for governance is delegated by God to the entire community of the faithful or the Ummah. This, however, is not the same as democracy in any Western sense of the word. Similarly, if it were possible to identify the moral principle underlying welfare provision in an ideal Islamic state, it would be embodied in the concept of Zakat, the religious duty imposed on Muslims to give a proportion of their disposable wealth for distribution to members of the Ummah who are in need. This duty, however, should not be interpreted as simple altruism or mutuality.
We shall attempt succinctly to convey the very particular significance of these key concepts -Zakat and Ummah -before moving on to discuss the ways in which Muslims are responding to the realities of the present world order, and the ways in which Islamic conceptions of social justice may have parallels with and relevance to some contested Western conceptions.
The word Zakat, translated from Arabic, means growth and also purity. Zakat is one of the five central pillars of the Muslim faith, each of which represents an absolute religious obligation: the others are testimony, prayer, fasting and pilgrimage. There are disagreements about the nature and extent of Zakat amongst some Islamic schools of jurisprudence, but there is complete unanimity as to the principle itself (Simonsen, 1988, p. 26) . According to the Quran (the holy text dictated to Muhammad by God) and the Sunnah (records of the prophet Muhammad's example) the giving of Zakat is an act of piety. Originally, Zakat was a voluntary act of love, second in importance only to prayer. It is to be distinguished from charity or alms giving (Sadaqah) which is voluntary (Hitti, 1964, p. 132) . Zakat is 'enrobed' with religious sanctity and ensures the redistribution of wealth, not by coercion, but through the acceptance of moral principles. Though subsequently constituted as an annual religious tax on property, Zakat is for the benefit of the Ummah as a whole and is supposed ultimately to bring to the donor an increase of property in this world and religious merit in the next (Aghnides 1916, p. 207) . The giving of Zakat can therefore be both altruistic and instrumental.
The rules pertaining to the liability for Zakat are contested, however. The principle is that all productive wealth which an individual owns above an established minimum shall be liable to an annual levy. The levy varies, being 2.5 per cent for Sunni Muslims and 5 per cent for Shia Muslims, and there is dispute between the Shafite, Maliki and Hanifite schools of Islamic jurisprudence as to whether a person may deduct the value of any debts owed from the portion of wealth that is liable to Zakat. Zakat should be paid to a public treasury (or Bait alMal) , wherever such is maintained by the state or community, but otherwise the duty may be discharged by giving individually to needy members of the Ummah. The duty cannot, however, be discharged by giving to members of one's immediate family.
To be liable to pay Zakat one must have reached maturity, be of the Muslim faith and be free (since a slave cannot own property). Complex categories have been developed touching upon the various kinds of wealth which can be taxed: these are generally held to include 'hoarded' wealth (that has lain unused for a year); the value of gold and silver, flocks and herds, and trade capital; and such 'extraordinary' sources of wealth as mines and treasure trove (which are taxable at a higher rate). The first Caliph to succeed the prophet Muhammad ruled that the duty to pay Zakat could be enforced by waging war against those Muslims who withheld it. What is more, the fourth Caliph ruled that, if the Bait al-Mal should not hold sufficient funds, he was empowered by God to collect as much of the riches of the rich as was needed over and above Zakat to meet the needs of the needy (Hussain, 1947, pp. 152-3) . Around the simple moral premise, therefore, there has developed a web of complex rules, exceptions and penalties.
Zakat none the less has a fundamental economic function, which is to ensure the proper distribution and circulation of wealth (Ali, 1993, p. 88) . The hoarding of wealth is believed to lead to economic malaise. Zakat purifies the wealth of the individual, but it also keeps the social, economic and political body or structure of the Umma from deterioration. To employ a metaphor that is often used for the purpose, Zakat taps the parts of the body where the blood is congested and transfers it to those parts which are weak or anaemic (Hussain, 1947, p. 137) . Islam is not opposed to personal wealth, but to its accumulation at others' expense. Zakat functions to prevent accumulation and prevent exploitation or social conflict. The Quranic ideal is that an acquisitive society must be a responsible society and Muslims are enjoined through Zakat to observe their social obligations. Wealth should never be idle but must circulate in order to serve one of two functions: if it is not productively invested, it must be used to promote the enjoyment of life (M. Ahmad, 1952, pp. 90-1) . It is intended that Zakat should reduce the gap between rich and poor.
Zakat is not only the duty of those with disposable wealth, it is the right of those in need. The Quran itself (51:19) says ' And in their wealth is the right of him who asks, and him who is needy'. It is argued that Zakat is the right of the community on the wealth of individuals, just as prayer is the right of God on all Muslims (Siddique, 1988, pp. 8-9) . The right specifically to receive from the Zakat fund or Bait al-Mal is reserved for eight categories of person. The two principal categories are 'the poor' and 'the indigent'. A distinction is thus drawn between those who cannot meet their needs yet refrain from begging and those who have resorted to charity; but both are entitled to Zakat. The other categories of person who may be paid are the appointed collectors of Zakat, who are entitled to be remunerated; recent converts to Islam, if they should have suffered hardship as a result; slaves, in order that they might buy their freedom; bankrupts, provided the cause of their indebtedness has been the pursuit of some worthy purpose; those who have committed themselves to some act of service or devotion, such as the pursuit of Jihad (the holy war); wayfarers, where they have become stranded in the course of their journey.
The significance of Zakat is both spiritual and political. The giving of Zakat is not an act of atonement as in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Zakat purifies the wealth out of which it is given and not the 'soul' of the donor. It serves the cause, not of charity, but of social justice. The Quran assumed an economic system based on individual enterprise and reward, but set within a moral framework that ensures support for the weak through the compassion and self-discipline of the strong. As Beedham (1994, p. 8) points out, 'Islamic economists say things quite similar to the sort of thing that is starting to be said by the people building a post-Marxist left in the West, ' Such economists argue that it is the principles which underpin the medieval institution of Zakat that remain important and they seek ways in which it can be adapted to meet the contemporary needs of the Ummah (see, e.g., M. Ahmad, 1952) . Zakat is regarded as the most effective insurance measure against social ills even if a pragmatic approach may be required in order to extend its scope (Z. Ahmad, 1991, p. 52) . Though Zakat revenue cannot be spent for purposes other than those specified in the Quran, there is within an Islamic state or community no prohibition upon the transfer of resources to the Bait al-Mal from the general budget in order to make good any shortfalls in relation to current social welfare objectives. Unlike ordinary forms of taxation or insurance, however, Zakat is believed to cement the sense of fellow feeling between Muslims and to bind together the Ummah.
T H E U M M A H A N D I T S G OV E R NA N C E
The Ummah refers to 'the community formed by those who accept the Messenger and his message' (Watt, 1961) . The concept is the cornerstone of Islamic ideology since it envisages a community of the faithful which is not dependent upon kinship, ethnicity or territorial boundaries. The Quran does not elucidate a concept of an Islamic state, but of a just society. None the less, Islamic political ideas and theories of the state have been developed since the seventh century based upon Quranic principles and these are to be found in the Sharia or divine law. The right to rule was held to belong to God and, in his name, to Muhammad his prophet. The Islamic political system following the death of the prophet was constructed on the basis of what is described as a twofold vicegerency or delegation of authority: the authority of God was vested in the Muslims; the authority of the prophet was vested in the Caliph (Hassan, 1988, p. 50) . In practice, the Caliph assumed both political and religious functions as leader of the Ummah and representative of the prophet (imam) respectively.
The interpretation of Quranic principles and the evolution of Sharia law have remained in the hands of generally conservative and often disputatious religious scholars. As a consequence, the ideal of popular vicegerency -the sovereignty of the Ummah -has been translated into what Beedham describes as a 'democratic deficit ' (1994, p. 12) . Overcoming that deficit he argues represents 'the biggest test of Islam's ability to give its people more of the advantages of the modern world' (ibid.). The issues here would seem to be twofold. First, can an Islamic state exist at all? Second, can an Islamic state separate its religious and political functions?
The 'true' Islamic state is held to have existed only during the life of the prophet and during the period of the first four Caliphs (known as 'the rightly guided ones') in the ancient city of Medina. Like the classi-cal Athenian city-state, Medina represented an ideal society of 'freemen' who professed to and advocated the values of justice, equality, brotherhood and peace. It was in the Medinese state that the Ummah was formed and that the supreme and unequivocal authority of the prophet in political, civil military and religious affairs was established.
At the advent of Islam, the concepts of state and nation were unknown and one purist interpretation is that Islam resides within a universal, world-wide Ummah which knows no territorial boundaries. Sardar, for example, draws upon scholarly authority to ask the question: are not the terms 'Islam' and 'state' contradictory? Is an Islamic state possible or indeed even desirable? (Sardar, 1985, p. 126) . In one sense this chimes with the doubts expressed by radical Western thinkers about the efficacy of nation-states in the context of a global world order, but in an earlier era another version of this interpretation was called in aid of aggressive military incursions to establish Muslim empires. Iqbal, on the other hand, suggests that such interpretations have stood in the way of progress and an understanding of Islam's place in the contemporary world. He has argued that the truth of Islam lies neither in nationalism nor imperialism, but in a league of nations. Islam should recognise artificial boundaries (such as those which were often forcibly imposed on Muslims by non-Muslims in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) and racial distinctions for 'facility of reference only', and not for restricting the social horizons of its members (Iqbal, 1974, p. 158) . In the absence of explicit guidance from the Quran, Islam has had to come to terms with the concept of the nation-state.
However, when it comes to establishing an Islamic state and an Islamic form of government, the ideal of the popular vicegerency of the Ummah can, as we have seen, be overwhelmed by the ideological power of imams and scholars to produce what Asghar Ali Engineer has characterised as a form of 'medieval dictatorship ' (1980, p. 119) . Conservative Muslim thinkers of the modern era like Maududi (1974 and 1986) insist upon the indivisibility of the Islamic way of life and the Shariah law. A government constituted by popular will has the legitimacy to carry on the business of state and is vested with the powers sub-delegated, as it were, by the Ummah as well as the powers delegated by the prophet. The Islamic state is therefore both religious and ideological. This is challenged, for example, by Siddique (1988) who insists that the Ummah is a social organisation based on religion, while an Islamic state founded to attend to political exigencies is based on ideology alone. Much of this debate has hinged around the disputed liabilities of Islamic states towards non-Muslims and migrants, but it has far-reaching significance for the extent to which elements of citizenship might be inferred from our understanding of the rights and capacities of the Ummah.
Shariah law is in some respects inimical to Western conceptions of human rights (see, e.g., Eide and Rosas, 1995) . None the less, Shariah law contains underlying principles and concepts of justice which are recognisable to Western jurists. Some contemporary theorists would interpret its purposes in terms no less radical than the objectives of the United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights:
To make the law of Islam of the land, in order that equity may prevail; to arrange social and economic relations in such a way that every individual shall live in freedom and dignity, and shall find as few obstacles as possible and as much encouragement as possible in the development of his personality; to enable all Muslim men and women to realise the ethical goals of Islam not only in their beliefs but also in the practical spheres of their lives; to ensure to all non-Muslim citizens complete physical security as well as complete freedom of religion, of culture, and of social development; to defend the country against attack from without and disruption from within; and to propagate the teachings of Islam to the world at large: it is in these principles, and in these alone, that the concept of an Islamic state finds its meaning and justification. (Asad, 1980, p. 33) Expressed in this form, Shariah law is by no means inimical to the development of social rights and, as we have seen, Zakat provides a practical and moral basis for welfare provision in Muslim society. For Muslim writers like Engineer (1980) social justice and equality are axioms of an Islamic state and, he would argue, oil rich Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are so unjust and so inured to the corrosive effects of Western consumerism as not to be truly Islamic. A question remains, however, about the capacity which is afforded to members of the Ummah to assert their rights.
There is a very particular issue here for Muslim women. The general thrust of Quranic teaching is that men and women are equal but different. The rights which Islam grants to women, though they are of no less value, are not identical to those granted to men, just as the duties and punishments it imposes are different for women than for men (Mutahari, 1981) . Quranic principles are held to support sexual equality in the fields of education, politics and economics (e.g., Siddiqui, 1952) , but the Quran (4:34) itself declares that men 'have authority' over women. Over the centuries, the moral preoccupation of the male scholars and jurists of Islam has been to restrain women because of the supposed dangers which by nature they pose for men (Ahmed, 1976, pp. 151-2) . Such teaching has been used in various parts of the world to defend discriminatory and repressive cultural practices in relation to women (Brooks, 1995) . Once again, liberal Muslim commentators insist that the treatment of women in many Muslim societies is contrary to the spirit of Islam and represents a failure to realise the revolutionary Quranic concept of sexual equality: Quranic injunctions they insist can and should be interpreted in the light of the 'ethos of our time' (Engineer, 1980, pp. 195-7) . It is important therefore to distinguish between culturally inspired patriarchy and such genuine impediments as derive from Quranic dictates. The latter, it has been suggested, though significant, may not represent the most intractable obstacle to rapprochement between Islam and the West (Beedham, 1994) . 1 We are brought back to the so called 'democratic deficit'. The sovereignty of the Ummah is guaranteed in principle by provision in Sharia law for consultation or Shura. Governments are required to consult the people about the policies they follow. It is supposed that the Ummah can only be governed through its own consensus since the community of God will never agree upon an error. In theory, Quranic principles may be applied in accordance with Ijma (interpretations arrived at by general consensus of the Ummah), though this is, to put it mildly, a difficult thing to achieve. In practice, significant changes to Shariah law are achieved by Itjehad (the 'independent' interpretation of religious scholars). Ijma and Itjehad provide ways of recasting Islam, of adapting the Shariah to contemporary aspirations and conditions. The issue, however, is how best to empower the Ummah to control that process. Recent Muslim writers like Sardar acknowledge that the principle of Shura does not mean 'the handpicking of a group of sycophants ' (1985, p. 153) . He argues critically that the acquisition of power without the genuine consent of the Ummah amounts to a 'conquest' of the Muslim community and a betrayal of Islam. The argument for a 'truly' Islamic welfare state has still to be won.
P R AG M AT I C I S L A M
There are presently around 1 billion Muslims in the world. While most live in the thirty-eight countries which have Muslim majorities, around a third live as minorities in some forty-nine non-Muslim countries (IMMA, 1994) . Islam is at one and the same time a world religion responding to the contingencies of global affairs and a minority religion whose adherents must adapt to the contingencies of life in an extrinsic cultural environment.
Muslim countries exhibit extraordinary diversity. They range from oil rich states like Saudi Arabia, which retain essentially feudal political relations, through largely poverty stricken 'developing' democracies like Pakistan and Bangladesh, to revolutionary (though not wholly undemocratic) Islamic states like Iran. There is considerable unrealised scope for comparative empirical studies of the substantive welfare institutions to be found in such countries. The authors do not here propose to preempt such research, but what is clear is that Islamic principles such as Zakat are often applied within structures which are essentially non-Islamic. While Islamic scholars have debated the ways in which Zakat may be interpreted as a form of taxation appropriate to a modern state (Sharif, 1963) , or the power of an Islamic state to raise taxes over and above Zakat (Iqbal and Khan, 1981) , Zakat tends in practice to remain as a parallel or supplementary channel of revenue raising and distribution. As in other spheres of economic activity, such as banking, dual systems -secular and Islamic -may operate side by side.
The global order to which Islam must accommodate itself is unquestionably capitalist. The spreading influence of radical right thinking in the First World, the collapse of communism in the Second World, and the far-reaching effects of the monetarist policies of the IMF and World Bank in the Third World, signal a near universal triumph of a neoliberal version of the capitalist project and of the patterns of poverty and inequality which such an ideology is prepared to tolerate (see, e.g., Taylor-Gooby, 1994). Islam's attitude to free-market capitalism is, as we have seen, ambiguous: it supports wealth creation and enterprise, but it is opposed to exploitation and to the 'hoarding' of wealth. One Quranic prohibition expressly condemns as usury the lending of money at interest. Muslims seeking to raise capital in order to compete in the world economy have been developing ingenious ways of accommodating their faith with their business objectives. Rather than raising finance through loans, they develop risk-sharing networks in which financiers acquire shares in businesses and must share the profits if the enterprise succeeds and the losses if it fails (see, e.g., Beedham, 1994, p. 9 ). In the context of an international economic order predicated upon essentially nineteenth-century concepts of individual entrepreneurialism and limited liability, Muslims are exploring new ideas based on collective risk-sharing. It remains to be seen whether elements of these ideas might perhaps translate from the sphere of trade and industry to inform the sphere of social and welfare provision.
In the case of minority Muslim communities in countries like Britain, little is known about the ways in which their faith accommodates a relationship with the welfare state. Cultural issues associated, for example, with child-rearing practices may represent a particular focus of tension between Muslim communities and health and social care professionals (see Fitches, 1995) . It is difficult, however, to establish the significance of religious belief to Muslims' perceptions of their citizenship. Research by Law et al. (1994) has shown that Bangladeshi Muslims in Leeds by and large accepted that they had a right to claim social security benefits from the British state. Some saw that right arising on a secular basis from the taxes and National Insurance contributions which they had paid in the past; others were conscious of a parallel with Islamic systems and the right of the needy to Zakat. More research is needed, however, to establish the attitudes and beliefs of British Muslims to their rights and obligations as citizens.
It should not, of course, be assumed that Britain's estimated 3 million Muslims (of whom at least two-thirds are British born) represent a single homogeneous community. Though most are Sunni Muslims with ethnic origins in the South Asian sub-continent, there are differences and tensions between the mystic devotionalism of Barelvi Muslims, the selfsufficient conservation of Deobandi Muslims and the fundamentalism of the largely middle-class (and marginal) Saudi backed Jamaat Muslims (Modood, 1990) . By and large, however, British Muslims are politically pragmatic.
For example, the unsuccessful but high profile campaign by British Muslims to obtain voluntary aided status (i.e., state funding) for independent Muslim schools has been marked by its moderate style and the willingness of Muslim communities to organise self-help solutions in the form of Madrasahs (supplementary Muslim schools). The Muslim Educational Trust, while complaining of the 'negative attitude' of the British political educational authorities upon the question of voluntary aided status, does so from a position which acknowledges that 'an education system which is grappling to come to terms with the needs of a pluralistic society cannot be expected to provide a full Islamic education for Muslim children in nondenominational maintained schools' (Sarwar, 1994, p. 28) . Even radical Muslim movements, such as Hizb-e-Tehrir, who favour the creation of a worldwide Muslim state, advocate the building of a network of independent but British based Muslim institutions and representative bodies with tangible links to the worldwide Ummah. They are for their part insistent that this should be achieved without assistance from the British state, or indeed from other Muslim states (such as Saudi).
Though by no means universally supported -least of all by more radical Muslim tendencies -a broadly similar strategy was advocated by the late Kalim Siddiqui and the 'Muslim Parliament'. The Muslim Parliament of Great Britain was inaugurated in 1992 upon the basis of a Muslim Manifesto drawn up by Siddiqui (Muslim Institute, 1990) . The sub-title of the manifesto is ' A strategy for survival' and this reflects Siddiqui's view that British Muslims represent an oppressed minority who cannot look to the British welfare state for anything other than minimal assistance: British Muslims should rely upon their own strengths and their own resources. 2 Siddiqui's vision was informed in part by the example of British Jews who, since the late nineteenth century, have developed parallel forms of political organisation (the Boards of Deputies) and welfare provision. It is worth recalling that such institutions as the Jewish Sick Room Helps Society in the East End of London provided a model which was subsequently followed by local authorities in the development of state health visiting services (Marks, 1990 ). High quality private or voluntary Jewish welfare systems continue to this day to play an important role for parts of the Jewish diaspora, for example in the USA (Simon, 1991) and Canada (Tzuk, 1983) . Siddiqui also emphasises the important pastoral and helping roles which can be played in community life by the mosque, as other churches indeed often provide for their congregations (cf. Harris, 1995) .
The Muslim Parliament is constituted as a consultative body of Muslims drawn (but not elected) from Muslim communities throughout Britain. It has created a network of specialist bodies, including regional and local Parliament Groups, the Muslim Women's Institute and the self-appointed Halal Food Authority (MPGB, 1995) . Most important, however, is the Bait al-Mal al-Islami, a registered charity created to provide a central public treasury for all British Muslims.
The writ of the Muslim Parliament does not run throughout all British Muslim communities, nor does the Bait al-Mal al-Islami receive all the payments of Zakat which British Muslims make. None the less, the Muslim Parliament urges British Muslims to pay Zakat and voluntary charitable donations (Sadaqah) to the Bait al-Mal al-Islami, and offers guidance upon the calculation of personal liability to Zakat: specific guidance couched, not in terms of sheep and goat herds, but of cars and mortgages. The funds of the Bait al-Mal al-Islami are deployed partly to support charitable programmes (such as aid for Bosnian Muslims) but also more directly to support independent Islamic educational initiatives and loans to Muslim students in Britain, and to promote health and welfare through individual grants to needy British Muslim families. The Muslim Parliament is interesting, since it represents a systematic attempt to build a parallel Islamic welfare system to supplement the British welfare state, and an attempt to update Muslim thinking on the principles of Zakat as they might apply within a nonIslamic late-capitalist society.
It is not contended that Islam provides an alternative to the welfare state, nor that it offers an answer to the current malaise of the welfare state. It does however contain insights which might inform our thinking about the future of welfare.
In his seminal work, The Gift Relationship (1970), Richard Titmussarguably the grandfather of social policy as an academic disciplinedevoted a chapter to the question 'Who is my stranger?' The study which elicited this question was one in which Titmuss demonstrated both the practical and the moral superiority of blood transfusion services based on free donations, compared with services based on market principles. He used the highly symbolic issue of blood donation to develop a wider discussion about altruism, welfare and 'the right to give'. Whereas industrial capitalism had extinguished the giftexchanges which characterised earlier community oriented societies, in the development of the welfare state, he claimed, there was evidence of the renaissance of the theme of the gift. Titmuss spoke of a unity between welfare policy and ethical considerations, and about the needs which human beings have for participation and individual identity. Much of social policy, he contended, is concerned 'with "stranger" relationships, with processes, institutions and structures which encourage or discourage the intensity and extensiveness of anonymous helpfulness in society; with "ultra obligations" which derive from our own character and are not contractual in nature ' (ibid., 212) .
A Muslim might remark that, in the example of Zakat, there lies an institution which achieves precisely such effects and which required no 'renaissance'. Zakat serves the needs of other anonymous members of the Ummah. The obligation to contribute arises out of faith and piety and is not conditional. Zakat represents a Muslim's 'right to give'. Islam itself provides a moral basis for 'ultra obligations'. Indeed, Islam's commitment to 'equality' and 'fraternity' predated by far the seventeenth and eighteenth-century revolutions of England, France or America. The real point of ideological difference is in the conception 'liberty'.
Here, of course, we must be alive to the deep divisions within Western ideologies about the nature of liberty or freedom in relation to the social rights of citizenship. In the Fabian tradition, Titmuss' concern was with people's freedom from the coercion of market forces. The social rights of citizenship were supposed to guarantee that substantive benefits should flow from our civil and political freedoms. The radical right, in contrast, regard freedom quite differently. For them, social rights are a 'mirage' (Hayek, 1976) and it is the collective redistribution of wealth which infringes freedom of choice, including the freedom of individuals to interpret their social obligations as they please and to fulfil them voluntarily through charitable endeavour. The advantage of welfare benefits financed from compulsory contributions or taxes is that, like Zakat, they may be provided as of right and not as charity. The conception of liberty which Islam most offends is the neo-liberal anti-welfare version. In a sense, however, this is beside the point. To the left it is the market which corrodes freedom and altruism; to the right it is the state; for Islam it is not a question of freedom or altruism but of faith.
Faith has no need for liberty. Michael Ignatieff has argued that the price of Westerners' freedom to choose is that they 'cannot have the second freedom, the certainty of having chosen rightly ' (1994, pp. 135-6) . Speaking to a Western audience, Ignatieff contends that 'few of us would exchange the freedom to choose our own beliefs and our own vocation for the solidarity of the Islamic or Stalinist theocracies of the modern age', but he asks, 'is there a form of society which could reconcile freedom and solidarity? ' (ibid.) . This is the challenge, but the example of Islam should not be so lightly dismissed. The concepts of Zakat and the Ummah provide one basis for understanding social rights and obligations and the fact that their essence lies in belonging. Ignatieff 's thesis is that:
Modernity is changing the locus of belonging: our language of attachments limps suspiciously behind, doubting that our needs could ever find larger attachments. Already, however, we can just begin to feel our old attachments, our old citizenship being emptied of its rationale . . . We think of belonging in moral terms . . . Yet the moral relations that exist between my income and the needs of strangers at my door pass through the arteries of the state [emphasis added] . . . We need justice, we need liberty, and we need as much solidarity as can be reconciled with justice and liberty. But we also need, as much as anything else, language adequate to the times we live in. (ibid., p. 141) The authors of this article do not agree with each other in matters of religious belief, though together we accept the need to forge a common language adequate to our time. It is at the level of language that we are struck by the common use of the same powerful metaphor in Muslims' explanations of the functions of Zakat for the Umma, in Titmuss' illustration of the 'gift relationship' and in Ignatieff 's critique of the welfare state. The metaphor is that of blood and the circulatory system of the human body. The basis for a common language, through which more literally to grapple with the ways in which life chances flow within the body of humanity may already exist.
N O T E S 1 The authors recognise that this is an issue of critical relevance to social policy which requires a paper in its own right. However, as men (one non-Muslim and one Muslim), we are mindful that rather too much of that which has already been written about women in Islam has been written by men. 2 This account is drawn in part from a personal interview with Kalim Siddiqui in May 1995.
